AN ATTACK ON OUR LIBERTIES THE GOVERNMENT’S BILL WOULD RESTORE DESPOTIC CENSORSHIP

AN ATTACK ON OUR LIBERTIES
THE GOVERNMENT’S BILL WOULD RESTORE DESPOTIC CENSORSHIP

CHRIS MERRITT

The government’s plan to control what can be said online would set back the cause of liberty by
centuries. Without fundamental change, the Digital Duty of Care Bill should not proceed.
At the heart of this bill are vague and open-ended terms that would turn the regulation of
communications on its head.
Until now, Australians have been free to say and do anything that is not unlawful.
That principle is the basis of our liberties. It recognises that our rights – including freedom of
communication – are innate. They are ours by right of citizenship and are not a privilege bestowed
by those in authority.
But even freedom of communication, the most fundamental of our liberties, is not absolute. It is
balanced against other rights such as the right to be free from defamation.
Balancing other rights against freedom of communication is of such vital importance to our
liberties that only parliament can be trusted to do the job.
Even then, restrictions should be enacted with precision in order to prevent excessive suppression.

The legitimacy of this process rests on the fact that the community has entrusted parliament, our
ultimate decision-making body, with responsibility for maintaining our rights.
This system of democratic lawmaking is the reverse of less enlightened times when freedom of
communication was a privilege, not a right, and required prior approval from those in power.
That authoritarian arrangement would be restored by the Digital Duty of Care Bill that is now
before an inquiry in the Senate. It would empower the eSafety Commissioner and online service
providers to prevent dissemination not just of unlawful information, such as support for terrorism,
but of a vast category of information that breaches no law but is deemed by bureaucrats to be
“seriously harmful”.
This bill bypasses the need for parliament to declare specific forms of speech unlawful and to
demonstrate why suppression is necessary.
It would do this by using vague and ill-defined terms to give the eSafety Commissioner maximum
flexibility to decide what needs to be suppressed in order to provide a “safe” online environment.
In clause 25F (f), for example, this bill would require online service providers, overseen by the
commissioner, to decide what is and is not in the public interest – a role that is beyond the
competence of both and is best confined to parliament.
Educational material on topics that are considered by the commissioner to be “seriously harmful”
could only be disseminated if the commissioner also deems it to be “not contrary to the public
interest”.
The commissioner would have the same veto over the dissemination of literary and artistic works.

Because there are no criteria in the bill on how that “public interest” assessment is to be
applied, the future of online education about the arts, literature and everything else would depend
on the commissioner’s unfettered discretion.
The fact that this provision exists shows this bill is intended to give the eSafety Commissioner
the power to censor “seriously harmful” online education on an unlimited range of subjects based on
her unfettered judgment of what is not in the public interest.
It is hard to imagine any legitimate grounds for censoring educational material.
But if that is what the government wants, it should at least be done transparently. It should bring
a bill before parliament listing the educational material it wishes to ban and all the art and
literature it considers “seriously harmful”.
There must be some. Otherwise why include this provision?
By embracing vague terms and unfettered discretion, this bill is a direct descendant of
authoritarian arrangements that were discarded centuries ago.
Before the English Civil War freedom of communication was not a right. It was a privilege that was
controlled by officials and the church. Information could not be published without prior approval.
Online service providers who defy the eSafety Commissioner risk fines of more than $1m. But in the
17th century, the penalty for ignoring the censors was worse.
In 1634 puritan lawyer William Prynne was branded on both cheeks and had his ears removed for
writing a pamphlet that impugned the character of one of England’s worst tyrants, King Charles I,
and his Queen.

That, however, was not the end of the story. Prynne was pursued a second time. The stumps of his
ears were removed and his nose was slit.
In 1644, in the early stages of the Civil War that led to the King’s execution, John Milton argued
in his Areopagitica for the abolition of prepublication licensing and censorship.
“Give me the liberty to know and to utter freely according to conscience, above all liberties,”
Milton wrote.
In 1695 prepublication licensing came to an end in England. But in Canberra, the arguments of
Milton and the treatment of Prynne have been forgotten.
We are in danger of slipping back to an era in which freedom of communication depends not on
properly enacted laws but on the view of unelected officials.
Parliament is in danger of being hoodwinked into giving the executive branch of government –
ministers and officials – kinglike powers that have no place in a democratic society.
If particular categories of information are so dangerous they need to be suppressed, they should be
made unlawful by a precisely drafted law enacted by parliament.
Censorship of lawful content is the legacy of tyrants.
Chris Merritt is vice-president of the Rule of Law Institute of Australia. This article draws on
the author’s evidence on Monday to the Senate committee inquiry into the Online Safety Amendment
(Digital Duty of Care) Bill.